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FOREWORD
OH GOD! CAN I SAY THAT IN PUBLIC?
DoucLAs W. KMIEC*
The papers in this symposium inquire whether there is an
appropriate place for religious discourse in the American public
square. It is a jarring, but necessary, inquiry for a Nation
founded upon both the presupposition of the existence of a
Supreme Being and the unfettered individual freedom to deny,
disregard, and even disparage such belief. The founding genera-
tion, of course, saw no necessary conflict between a simultaneous
corporate or sovereign affirmation of a Creator and individual
immunity from legal coercion in matters of religion. The Decla-
ration of Independence fixed a national philosophy and a loca-
tion of unalienable (that is, pre-political and pre-governmental)
rights in a Creator. The Bill of Rights and its two-part security for
the individual pursuit of religious freedom-a protection against
both having to attend or support a national church (no establish-
ment) and immunity from interference with one's chosen means
of religious belief or practice (free exercise)-abides analytically
then, and now, in harmony. After all, that my government sees
God's hand does not force mine.
The modern age-or present circumstance-puts corporate
or sovereign philosophy and individual freedom on a collision
course. In the last half century, accommodating religious free-
dom has come to be misconstrued as impermissible religious
endorsement, and the democratic process has obscured the pro-
position that a government by consent was only possible because
we were all declared to be equal-not in talent or advantage-
but before God, and a century and Civil War later, "under law."
For this reason, the question of religiously-grounded argument
in the public discourse is a sensitive one. Failure to allow relig-
iously influenced perspectives can reasonably be argued not only
to deny the Nation's foundational presupposition, but also to
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start us down the road of censorship, whether by self or legal
proscription. Alternatively, over reliance upon religious source
can be claimed to result in divisiveness and discord among a free
people immersed in the cultural uniformity of the same cable
channels and fast food restaurants. More threateningly, when
rogue nations, or menacing individuals with alliances with those
nations, anchor public policy upon religion, there may even be
an invitation to religious war-a prospect that before 9-11
seemed distant or remote, but now has some regrettable
plausibility.
How is one to know the proper scope of public reliance
upon God? Most of us are introduced to the faith of our fami-
lies. Family instruction, being both highly personal and early
given, inevitably gives this handed-down religious tradition a
place of far greater theoretical significance in our individual for-
mation than the accidents of money, politics, or other temporal
influences. Yet, when we leave home, how free are we to speak
and act upon religious obligation in public settings-the school-
house, the legislative assembly, or the judicial bench? Each relig-
ious tradition would surely give a somewhat different answer. For
example,
Islam is not a faith of isolation or a faith which encourages
monasticism. Its moral order demands an ethical system
which requires the Muslim to meet and fulfill the responsi-
bility and obligation (taklij) of the divine trust .... The
ideal for Muslims is to live in an Islamic State where the
Islamic ideals of rule and shari'ah prevail.'
By contrast, since the Second Vatican Council, Catholic teaching
is that "the human person has a right to religious freedom" pre-
mised upon the very dignity of that human person.2 "The right
of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in
the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is
to become a civil right."' Of course, this has not always been the
Catholic view. Pope Leo XIII wrote as late as 1895 in Longinqua
oceani that "it would be very erroneous to draw the conclusion
that in America is to be sought the type of the most desirable
status of the Church, or that it would be universally lawful or
expedient for State and Church to be, as in America, dissevered
1. ETHICAL ISSUES IN Six RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 223, 225 (Peggy Morgan
& Clive Lawton eds., 1996).
2. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis Humanae 2 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/ii-vatican-council/documents/
vat-ii decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae en.html (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
3. Id.
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and divorced."4 The word "religion" may well be derived from
the Latin religio, meaning "to bind," but it is obvious that to what
one is bound differs across denominations, and by change in
interpretation, within denominations as well.
All this is further complicated by some unique American
confusions over the meaning of the religion clauses in Constitu-
tional text. There is a profound difference between the separa-
tion of church and state and the constitutional freedom of
religion. The difference was of immense importance to the foun-
ders, yet, as a comprehensive recent history reveals, "[fl] or many
Americans, the difference between these ideals has become diffi-
cult to discern."' The founding generation may have differed
over the wisdom of established churches among the several
States, or even direct financial assistance to churches generally,
but they "did not reject the utterly conventional assumption that
there was a necessary and valuable moral connection between
religion and government."6
While Thomas Jefferson is credited with coining the meta-
phor of a "wall of separation between church and state," it is now
well-documented that separationism took hold in America late in
the nineteenth century-prompted by Protestant fears of Catho-
lic immigrants and stoked by the bigotry and violence of the Ku
Klux Klan.
7
Protestants assumed that the separation of church and
state limited Catholics in their relations with government
but not Protestants, because whereas Catholics seemed to
defer to their church and act on its behalf, Protestants pre-
sumably followed the dictates of their individual con-
sciences and, in any case, belonged to diverse
denominations.8
Separationism became the mantra by which particular religious
believers were screened out of political matters.
In the 1870s the National Liberal League attempted to use
the idea of separation of church and state to limit the polit-
ical participation of religious groups and to challenge oth-
erwise secular laws that benefitted these groups, that were
4. MICHAEL DAVIES, THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AND RELIGIous LIBERTY
102 (1992) (quoting Leo XII1).
5. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 480 (2002).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 407-31.
8. Id. at 481.
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influenced by them, or that coincided with their distinctive
moral obligations.9
It is too glum a tale to recount here how Hugo Black, whose
association with the Klan did not become public until after the
Senate confirmed him as associate justice of the United States in
1937, would go on to enshrine the erroneous assumption of
separationism into Court precedent. This account is now objec-
tively and dispassionately documented.1" The Klan had provided
the young Justice Black with his vehicle of prominence in elec-
tion to the U.S. Senate from Alabama. With the Grand Dragon
of the Klan his unofficial campaign manager, Black crisscrossed
the State. Said James Esdale, the Klan leader, "I arranged for
Hugo to go to Klaverns all over the state, making talks on Cathol-
icism . . . Hugo could make the best anti-Catholic speech you
ever heard."" Ten years after his appointment to the Supreme
Court bench, Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of the
Township of Ewing,12 would transform religious freedom into sep-
aration with the following assertion: "[t]he 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."'" While shrouded between two unassailable
precepts against a national church or religious favoritism, the
middle proposition proposing to make government separate
(and therefore indifferent) from all religion would thereafter
trouble the Court and the nation.
The extent of that separation is no better revealed than in
the Ninth Circuit's insustainable proposition that the pledge of
allegiance cannot contain the words "under God." In Newdow v.
United States Congress,'4 Michael Newdow, a self-proclaimed athe-
ist, sought to prevent a local California school district from hav-
ing the school day begin with the pledge of allegiance.
California state law requires schools to begin with a patriotic
exercise, 5 and the pledge satisfies this requirement. No student
is compelled to recite the pledge, so Newdow's complaint-
which he filed against the Congress, the President, the school
9. Id. at 484.
10. Id. at 429.
11. Id. at 427 (citing ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BioGRAPHY 104
(1994); see also DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THEJUDICIAL REVOLUTION 117 (1977)).
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. Id. at 15-16.
14. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (subsequently corrected in minor
respects).
15. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (1989).
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district, and various others-complained merely that his daugh-
ter had to "watch and listen."
Since 1954, the pledge has contained the words, "one nation
under God." Newdow wanted the court to order the President
and Congress to remove the words. Properly, the court found
that neither the President nor Congress were proper parties and
that the federal judiciary could not simply order them to strike
words from duly enacted statutes. 6 It was surprising that the.
court even found Newdow to have standing, since he is reported
to be a non-custodial parent whose wishes directly contradict
those of the custodial parent and the child."v Be that as it may,
the court enjoined the school district from the recitation of the
pledge. "'
The court's thinking, in addition to being in direct contra-
diction of the Declaration, which it nowhere acknowledges, and
the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, which it dismisses, 1" is
mechanical and conclusory at best. The court writes: "l[t] o recite
the Pledge is not to describe the United States," but it does not
explain why not.z° Mocking the founders, the court majority
proposes that reciting that we are a nation under God is identical
to being a nation "under Zeus."'" Here, the court does explain,
but it is an explanation anchored in Justice Black's faux neutral-
ity. The school's practice, complains the court, is not "neutral
with respect to religion." 2 So, the court reasons, bring on the
censors and the historical revisionists.
Judge O'Scannlain, for himself and five other members of
the Ninth Circuit, dissented from the denial of the rehearing en
banc of Newdow."23 Calling the Ninth circuit panel decision a
"serious mistake," Judge O'Scannlain carefully illustrates the
nature of the error by beginning with the rather obvious fact that
the pledge is simply not a religious act.2 4 To think it so, is to put
the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, the
National Motto, and even the National anthem in jeopardy of
establishment clause invalidation. This would make hypocrites of
the founders, say the dissenting judges, and drive "any and all
16. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 602.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 612.
19. See Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th
Cir. 1992).
20. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607.
21. Id. at 607-08.
22. Id. at 608.
23. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 321 F.3d 772 (2003).
24. Id. at 776.
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references to our religious heritage out of our schools, and even-
tually out of our public life."
25
The Supreme Court has had a difficult time interpreting the
religion clauses, but thirteen justices, including five members of
the present Court, have opined at various times that the words of
the pledge are not a prayer, and by reasoned implication, not
unconstitutional. The words may solemnize, they may seek to
express confidence in providence, they may anchor human right
and dignity beyond legislative repeal, or they may simply serve
the function of acknowledging historical fact. They do not, how-
ever, create a religious establishment or compel adherence to
any particular belief or practice contrary to constitutional text.
The dissent in Newdow II does an admirable job of illustrat-
ing not only that the pledge is not a religious act, but also how
that fact puts it outside the discussion of the Court's school
prayer cases. These points are well stated and need not be
rehearsed here, but what does bear emphasis in light of these
symposium papers is the dissent's insight that the Newdow major-
ity, in the name of protecting neutrality, tolerance, and dissent,
denies each. As Judge O'Scannlain writes, "[i]n affording
Michael Newdow the right to impose his views on others, [the
court] affords him a right to be fastidiously intolerant and self-
indulgent."26 Here, the dissenters have identified the real harm
in this dispute: the opinion "confers a favored status on atheism
in our public life."2" Insofar as government, through schools and
social programs, occupies an ever-expanding portion of all life,
this is not to be lightly passed. The Ninth Circuit majority creates
a bias against religion, and in so doing stands the First Amend-
ment on its head.
But the denial of the founder's anchoring of American
human right upon sovereign presupposition of a Creator does
more than deny individual liberty. It also invites the omnicom-
petent state. When the 83rd Congress added the words "under
God," it expressly denied any interference with anyone's free
exercise, whether that exercise of freedom would individually
choose to honor God or deny Him. No, the legislative history is
plain: the recital is to prevent expansion of the government; to
prevent denial of civil liberties that no government or civil liberty
may usurp.28 In this, the pledge more accurately reflects how the
25. Id. at 778.
26. Id. at 785.
27. Id. at 786.
28. H.R. REP. 1693, to accompany H.J. Rs. 243, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3
(1954).
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founding generation viewed the separation of powers as the sur-
est security of civil right. Anchoring basic rights upon a meta-
physical source is very much part of that structural separation, for
without God, the law is invited to become god. This was well
known to Rousseau and Marx who both complained that
acknowledging God creates a competition or check upon the sec-
ular state.
Ironically, the drafter and promoter of the originally drafted
pledge in 1891, socialist Frances Bellamy, misdescribed his
nation in the original pledge with the purpose not of affirming
the United States of America, but with the desire of promoting
Hegel's "total state" or world government.29 Bellamy's plan was
for civic creed that would not distinctively describe America, but
would remind those who recited it that the state was to prevail
over the individual or any competing source of authority,
whether church or family.3" That the original pledge did not
even mention America by name, calling only for a pledge of alle-
giance to "my flag," was ultimately noticed, and much to the dis-
tress of Bellamy, the first re-wording of the pledge in 1942
specified that the allegiance was being promised to the United
States of America."' The 1954 reference to God merely com-
pleted that descriptive exercise.32
So we come to the contributions of this volume. They cover
quite a range. Each adds unique insight into religious expres-
sion in public space. Staying for a moment, however, with the
correction of bad history, David Barton's responsible correction
of the Jeffersonian record must surely rank high. Quoting Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Barton reminds us that "[i]t is impossible to
build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken under-
standing of constitutional history .... -33 Barton's case that Jef-
ferson has been misused, misquoted, and misunderstood is
dramatic and convincing. The need to correct this error is, of
course, basic since, as Barton reveals, Jefferson has been relied
upon by the Court in all of its establishment clause cases.34
Observing that Jefferson's presidential and public actions would





33. David Barton, The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First
Amendment, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'V 399, 410 (2003) (citing
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
34. Id. at 418.
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"abysmally fail" the contemporary Court's jurisprudence, Barton
tries to untangle matters.
Going to the heart of the matter-Justice Black's misuse of
the "wall of separation" metaphor in Everson, Barton observes
how the letter to the Danbury Baptist association was a natural
outgrowth of the Baptists' affinity for the third president and his
anti-federalist views.35 The Baptists had suffered in the early
republic when power was centralized, with ministers frequently
subjected to violence. 6 It was this profound interference with
free exercise that prompted the Danbury association to write Jeffer-
son." The Baptists expressed anxiety that religious freedom was
understood by some as only a positive, not a natural, law right,
and thus, capable of being withdrawn selectively.38 Jefferson
fully understood their concern, since, as Barton nicely reminds
us, it was "his own." 9 But it was not a concern addressed to
impermissible establishment, but to reminding the Congress of
the United States that it was deprived of all legislative power over
mere religious opinion, and could regulate practice only when
such practice undermined the public order.4 ° Yet, when Black
misapplied Jefferson's metaphor and the balance of his letter to
the establishment clause, he invited the Court onto an odyssey of
using federal power to deny individual expressions of religious
belief, exactly contrary to Jefferson's concern.4' Provocatively,
Barton writes: "[i] magine the results ifJefferson's metaphor were
used as originally applied: virtually every one of the Court's
Establishment Clause decisions of recent years would be reversed
because the 'wall' would prohibit the government from interfer-
ing with the 'free exercise of religion' . . . .,42
Given that Jefferson has so often been portrayed as a cere-
monial Deist, Barton's historically grounded reappraisal needs to
be absorbed fully to reveal its importance. Suddenly the dichot-
omy between reason and faith, with Jefferson the child of the
enlightenment pictured as resentful of faith's pursuit of human
truth, melts away. Jefferson knew that man would be inclined to
look for truth in both revealed and empirical sources, as he had
done since Roman times. It was free inquiry that Jefferson
sought to protect, whether the inquiry is of religious or nonreli-
35. Id. at 412-13.
36. Id. at 412.
37. Id. at 414.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 415.
40. Id. at 418.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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gious source. Wrote Jefferson: "[h]ad not the Roman govern-
ment permitted free inquiry, Christianity could never have been
introduced."" Yes, Jefferson feared coercion-whether from
civil authority or hide-bound church-that would obscure or nar-
row the pursuit of knowledge, but in doing so, he did not deny
revelation's capability to inform us about the nature of the
human condition. As Barton nicely summarizes, "Jefferson was
not anti-clergy, only anti-autocratic and anti-hierarchical
clergy."4
Student writer Christine Niles takes on what she describes as
the incoherence of the secular/religious distinction." In doing
so, her thinking is much aligned with Barton's rehabilitated Jef-
ferson who, as just noted, saw the pursuit of truth as drawing on
all sources, religious included. Niles argues that secularism and
neutrality are not synonyms, though much of the Court's mod-
ern establishment clause jurisprudence, until lately, has assumed
them to be so.4 6 Carefully evaluating the secularist assumptions
that attempt to privilege reason and empiricism, she illustrates
the extent of "faith" lurking beneath these seemingly secular
terms.4 7 Niles sees faith as analogous to trust or reliance upon
authority and nicely elaborates how both rationalism and scien-
tific inquiry beg the essential question and assume rationalism or
scientific inquiry as its trusted authority or major premise.4" By
this means, Niles de-thrones science and rationality from its pre-
sumed "high ground" above the sectarian. Quoting David
Novak, Niles reminds us that "[t]he question, then, is not a god
or no-god. The question is whose god.""9
What does this mean for religious discourse in the public
square? Niles contends that it ought not mean banishment or
censorship, a position she ascribes to important scholars like
Kathleen Sullivan of Stanford and others. Implicitly admitting
that a vibrantly pluralistic and religiously informed discussion
might lead to strife and disagreement, Niles nevertheless posits
that this is better than arbitrary favoritism for irreligion over
religion.5 1 What's more, she argues, Madison and the founding
43. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 232-34 (Query
XVII) (1794), cited in Barton, supra note 33, at 417.
44. Barton, supra note 33, at 445.
45. Christine L. Niles, Epistemological Nonsense? The Secular/Religious Dis-
tinction, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 561 (2003).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 581.
48. Id. at 565.
49. Id. at 569 (quoting David Novak, Law, Religious or Secular?, 86 VA. L.
REV. 569, 594 (2000)).
50. Id. at 577.
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generation anticipated that there would be contending factions,
even religious ones, seeking to win over the democratic pro-
cess.5 Can this work? Has the Nation become so diverse or frac-
tious as to deny what Niles and legal scholar Michael Perry call
the testing of all ideas in political debate? One would think not.
Even in the midst of an international war with distinctly religious
overtones, there is spirited debate over the morality of that war,
largely informed, no surprise, by a panoply of religious belief.
Nevertheless, moving to a specific subject and context-the
origin of human life as presented in public school classrooms,
Professor Kent Greenawalt posits that limits on religiously-
grounded instruction need to be erected.52 In particular, Profes-
sor Greenawalt elegantly endeavors to sketch his limitations or
guidelines for the appropriate consideration of evolution, crea-
tionism, and intelligent design." Because he supposes from con-
stitutionaljurisprudence that public schools should not teach the
truth or falsity of religious ideas, his guidelines necessitate
exploring what these competing theories of human origin mean
as well as the background definitions of science and religion.
Greenawalt differentiates science from religion by finding
that the former recounts empirically verifiable natural processes,
while the latter is dependent upon metaphysical, philosophical,
or spiritual belief.54 From this, Greenawalt concludes that crea-
tionism as retold in the Book of Genesis has "little scientific plau-
sibility" and therefore ought not be included within a public
school science course.55 By contrast, intelligent design theory is
given a place at the scientific table. The underlying assumptions
of intelligent design theory are that intelligent causes exist and
that these can be observed empirically by virtue of specific exam-
ples of human complexity (such as the growth and operations of
the human eye).
Professor Greenawalt is particularly open to intelligent
design since standard Darwinian theory-dependent as it is upon
natural selection and the origin of multiple species from one-is
not fully explainable in scientific terms. Fossil records have
yielded relatively few species intermediate between earlier and
later ones and little explains how complex organisms evolved
from simpler ones.56 Given that, Greenawalt's prescription is
51. Id. at 578.
52. Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id. at 325.
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merely one of academic humility, though he is careful to empha-
size that intelligent design cannot be taught as the alternative to
evolution since that would be subscription of religious belief.
Dr. Francis Beckwith writes a concurring essay to Professor
Greenawalt with both further elaboration of the scientific basis
for design theory as well as a nice reflection on how establish-
ment clause jurisprudence gets reconciled with academic free-
dom.5" As retold by Beckwith, the Supreme Court allows
freedom of inquiry in the classroom so long as it does not trans-
gress other specific constitutional guarantees. 8 This has not
resulted in much freedom for public school teacher expression
of religious sentiment, of course, since neutrality has been
assumed to mean secularity. This has broken down slightly in the
Court's tendency to allow students some leeway to bring their
own private religious beliefs into public school classroom under
equal protection or free speech rubrics, but the teachers-those
state agents behind the lectern-pretty much still need to keep
quiet.
Even as a bald-faced claim of academic freedom may not
secure teacher supplementation of the secular materials in the
curriculum, Beckwith, like Greenawalt, thinks the scientific basis
of design theory allows such discussion.59 This remains a far cry
from the robust forum envisioned by Niles. What allows some of
the gap between these positions to be filled is Beckwith's
thoughtful distinction between legislation that has the purpose
of establishing religious belief and that which is merely moti-
vated, in part, by such belief. As Beckwith reminds us, in crimi-
nal law, a defendant is guilty if he acted with the purpose of
accomplishing a particular outcome.6 ° It doesn't matter whether
the defendant had a kind or malevolent motivation. It is possible
that if a similar purpose/motivation distinction were to be
observed in constitutional decision-making, religious discussion
in the classroom from either teacher or student could round out
the universe of thought. But some ground clearing would need
to be done, since earlier cases unsuccessfully tried explaining ref-
erences to God in the Ten Commandments6' by drawing a
related, but ultimately more subjective, argument that there is a
difference between teaching that seeks a religious commitment,
57. Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the




60. Id. at 515 n.220.
61. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
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and teaching that does not. If teacher-led classroom discussion is
not directed at conversion or indoctrination, some of the Court's
most recent establishment case law might be read to find no con-
stitutional transgression.
62
Interestingly in light of the pledge of allegiance controversy,
Beckwith concludes his essay by exploring whether intelligent
design theory is out of bounds because the designer is inherently
religious. Beckwith does not respond to this by making the cor-
porate acknowledgment point made earlier in this essay that a
sovereign presupposition of a Creator has no bearing on the
scope of individual right to believe or disbelieve. Perhaps Beck-
with is reluctant to do so because the exclusionary force of the
misuse of Jefferson's wall metaphor has yet to be fully dislodged
from the Court's jurisprudence. Certainly, the Ninth Circuit
failed to fully appreciate the corporate acknowledgment/individ-
ual right dichotomy, and the U.S. Supreme Court has thus far
only commented in dicta about the pledge and other corporate
or sovereign recognition of the Divine. Beckwith simply takes
the path of not disqualifying intelligent design inquiry, even if it
is inherently religious, since it is not a specific creed and it has a
bearing on a substantial number of unanswered scientific
questions.
In another essay seeking to bring constitutional theory into
practical application, student Kyle Forsyth applies the Court's
establishment clause jurisprudence to conclude, soundly, that
President Bush's faith-based initiative is constitutional.6" Forsyth
decries older establishment clause models premised upon strict
separationism and deftly illustrates that a program designed to
enhance the effectiveness of social service fits squarely within the
Court's present approach.6 4 As he notes, it is easier to withstand
constitutional attack if social service beneficiaries make their own
choice between religious and nonreligious providers, but direct
funding of the nonreligious aspects of such services are also
acceptable, even if likely to spur initial litigation and challenge.6 5
To complete this essay, let me make mention of the fine sub-
missions from my colleagues, Professors Shaffer and Garnett.
Virtually everyone who has thought about the influence of relig-
ious belief on public questions has been influenced for the better
by the scholarship of Thomas Shaffer. Here, as elsewhere, he
62. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
63. Kyle Forsyth, Aeutrality and the Establishment Clause: The Constitutional
Status of "Faith-Based and Community Initiatives" After Agostini and Mitchell, 17
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 593, 594 (2003).
64. Id. at 618.
65. Id. at 609.
OH GOD! CAN I SAY THAT IN PUBLIC?
writes with the authenticity of a genuine witness of faith. Shaf-
fer's essay seeks to draw out a comparison between lawyers and
Biblical prophets.66 Those who seek to be lawyer prophets, says
Shaffer, necessarily must be in politics and in community.6 7 And
being there, they are often called by faith to be "relentlessly radi-
cal." The last supposition is one of Professor Shaffer's persistent
themes in writing, and in life. He is radically dedicated to the
manifestation of love of neighbor.
Drawing on Catholic social thought, Shaffer knows that a
lawyer prophet will necessarily need to address the poor and the
disaffected. Professor Shaffer references another erstwhile Notre
Dame colleague of mine, Dennis Goulet, who seeks to pierce the
claimed objectivity of economic analysis as much as Christine
Niles sought to illustrate the non-neutrality of secularism. Goulet
is not a lawyer, but he is prophetic to Shaffer since his "new eco-
nomics" attempts to put people at the center of economic
thought rather than people as expressed in supply and demand
curve. Shaffer especially likes Goulet's disaggregation of techno-
logical, political, and ethical argumentation.6" The first focuses
on the practicality of getting things done; politics maintains the
rules of the game; but importantly, ethics is promoted for its own
intrinsic value. On the last score, work is a manifestation of the
human personality, whether the work is seen as valuable in the
market or not. This point is illuminated wonderfully in Catholic
social teaching, and indeed is hard to find elsewhere in coherent
form. For this reason, Shaffer rightly concludes that "prophetic
politics in the law involve . .. a radical point of beginning; an
insistence on clear religious substance; and steady endurance in
the face of resistance and indifference . "..."69
Richard Garnett touches on the issue of capital punishment
and argues that the moral questions raised there, as elsewhere,
require an anthropological answer responsive to the deeper
question of what it means to be human. 0 In this, Professor Gar-
nett stands foursquare against the trivialization of faith-the pro-
position that it is no more significant than a hobby. Like the
others in the symposium, Garnett thinks the Court's establish-
ment jurisprudence has been misled by the Jeffersonian meta-
66. Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521 (2003).
67. Id. at 522.
68. See id. at 534.
69. Id.
70. Richard Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death
Penalty, 17 NOTRE DANIEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541 (2003).
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phor.71 The Constitution, Garnett writes, "neither mandates nor
implies a duty of self-censorship by believers; [nor] demand a
Naked Public Square; and active and engaged participation by
the faithful is perfectly consistent with the institutional separa-
tion of church and state .... A liberal democracy requires
civility, but it imposes no restriction on the religious vocabulary
or reasoning a believer may give for supporting or opposing pub-
lic decisions. Professor Garnett doubts whether every public dis-
cussion needs a moral/religious referent, but he is certain that
the State's claimed authority to punish with death does.73
The symposium papers do not present a unidimensional
view of religion in public life. That is how it should be. Rather, it
continues a debate that has been with us since the founding.
The predominant view in eighteenth century America is best
associated with Tocqueville and the proposition that religious
belief weaves moral value into the body politic in vital ways.
Religious faith encourages forgiveness and the care of others and
it reduces harmful and injurious behavior with far less coercion
than could be accomplished under law. Religion also supplies
the truth of the human person, and in so doing, places the foun-
dation of human right on a far more secure footing than any
positive enactment.
At the same time, there have always been dissident views that
feared religious influence on public decision. This was most
notably true where clergy and ecclesiastical hierarchy seemed to
demand obedience, not thought. The fears of clerical authority
were greatest in relation to the Catholic church, and as already
referenced, frequently exaggerated by those who propagated
hate or sought political advantage from it. Perhaps, because of
these irrational hatreds or suspicions of Catholicism, this volume
from a preeminent Catholic university law school is so welcome.
Indeed, the work presented here continues the tradition of this
fine journal by bringing faith to bear upon questions of law and
public policy. It is fair to see these excellent submissions not as
ideology, but as intellectual re-commitment to being always open
to ask what that relationship is or should be. This publication is
thus a living rejoinder to those who would deny the relevance of
faith to law and public question. Long may it flourish.
71. See id. at 550.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 554.
